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Summary
Background Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) causes severe lower respiratory tract infection 
in people. Previous studies suggested dromedary camels were a reservoir for this virus. We tested for the presence of 
MERS-CoV in dromedary camels from a farm in Qatar linked to two human cases of the infection in October, 2013.
Methods We took nose swabs, rectal swabs, and blood samples from all camels on the Qatari farm. We tested swabs 
with RT-PCR, with amplifi cation targeting the E gene (upE), nucleocapsid (N) gene, and open reading frame (ORF) 1a. 
PCR positive samples were tested by diff erent MERS-CoV specifi c PCRs and obtained sequences were used for 
phylogentic analysis together with sequences from the linked human cases and other human cases. We tested serum 
samples from the camels for IgG immunofl uorescence assay, protein microarray, and virus neutralisation assay.
Findings We obtained samples from 14 camels on Oct 17, 2013. We detected MERS-CoV in nose swabs from three 
camels by three independent RT-PCRs and sequencing. The nucleotide sequence of an ORF1a fragment 
(940 nucleotides) and a 4·2 kb concatenated fragment were very similar to the MERS-CoV from two human cases on 
the same farm and a MERS-CoV isolate from Hafr-Al-Batin. Eight additional camel nose swabs were positive on one 
or more RT-PCRs, but could not be confi rmed by sequencing. All camels had MERS-CoV spike-binding antibodies 
that correlated well with the presence of neutralising antibodies to MERS-CoV.
Interpretation Our study provides virological confi rmation of MERS-CoV in camels and suggests a recent outbreak 
aff ecting both human beings and camels. We cannot conclude whether the people on the farm were infected by the 
camels or vice versa, or if a third source was responsible.
Funding European Union projects EMPERIE (contract number 223498), ANTIGONE (contract number 278976), and 
the VIRGO consortium.
Introduction
An emerging betacoronavirus—Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)—causes illness 
characterised predominantly by mild-to-severe 
respiratory complaints, with most patients requiring 
admission to hospital because of pneumonitis or acute 
respiratory distress syndrome. Old age and the presence 
of comorbidities or immunosuppression seem to 
increase the risk of infection and are associated with 
severe forms of the disease. However, some patients can 
remain asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic and 
atypical presentations such as gastroenteritis have 
occurred.1 As of Dec 2, 2013, 163 laboratory-confi rmed 
cases, including 71 deaths, have been reported to WHO.2 
All of these cases were directly or indirectly linked to the 
Middle East region, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Jordan.
Coronaviruses reside in many animal hosts and can 
adapt to diff erent species, including people. MERS-CoV 
belongs to the lineage C betacoronaviruses, which are 
associated with bats3 and the closest relatives of 
MERS-CoV have been identifi ed in vesper bats from 
Europe, Asia, and South Africa.4–6 Notably, this 
coronovirus is able to replicate in various bat cell lines.7
Molecular clock dating of epidemiologically unlinked 
human MERS-CoV isolates estimated their divergence 
from a common ancestor in mid-2011, with a cluster of 
isolates from the eastern parts of the Arabian peninsula 
diverging in late 2012. These fi ndings suggest that the 
reported MERS-CoV diversity in human beings is the 
result of several independent, geographically structured, 
zoonotic events from an unknown reservoir in the 
Middle East.8,9 Human-to-human transmission has been 
noted, especially in health-care settings and households, 
but is thought to be relatively ineffi  cient.1
To determine how circulation of MERS-CoV in human 
beings is maintained and to mitigate the chain of 
transmission, identifi cation of possible animal 
reservoirs and modes of transmission is needed.10 
Limited available exposure history of patients suggest 
that contact with livestock, including dromedary camels, 
might have a role.1,9,11,12 In addition, our recent 
investigations have provided evidence for the circulation 
of MERS-CoV or a related virus in dromedary camels.13 
Both MERS-CoV spike protein binding antibodies and 
virus neutralising antibodies were reported in 
dromedary camels from diff erent regions, including 
Oman and Egypt, but no virus shedding could be 
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detected and, therefore, the signifi cance of these 
observations remained an issue of debate.13,14 In this 
study we aimed to assess presence of MERS-CoV in 
dromedary camels from a farm in Qatar that was linked 
to two human cases of MERS-CoV.
Methods
Outbreak investigation
In October, 2013, the Qatar Supreme Council of Health 
recorded two cases of laboratory confi rmed MERS-CoV. 
Case 1 involved a 61-year-old man who was the owner of 
a farm that he visited regularly. The patient had 
substantial contact with animals including camels, 
sheep, pigeons, and hens, and no history of travel 
outside of Qatar in the 2 weeks before becoming ill. 
MERS-CoV infection was diagnosed by E gene (upE) 
PCR on a sputum sample collected on Oct 13, 2013, 
in the National Virology Laboratory of Qatar. 
Case 2 involved a 23-year-old male employee of the farm 
owned by case 1 and was identifi ed in the close-contact 
investigation of that case. He was reported on Oct 17, 
2013, and had no underlying medical conditions and no 
recent travel history, but had regular contact with the 
animals on the farm. MERS-CoV infection was 
diagnosed in a throat swab taken on Oct 17, 2013, by the 
National Virology Laboratory of Qatar. Diagnosis for 
both cases was confi rmed (ORF1b and N gene PCR) by 
Public Health England.15,16 Qatari authorities, with 
support from WHO, did an epidemiological investigation 
at the farm within 1 week of diagnosis of the fi rst case, 
which included the collection of various clinical samples 
from the farm’s dromedary camels. Full details of the 
outbreak investigation will be described elsewhere.
Sample collection
We collected serum, rectal swabs, and nasal swabs from 
all camels present on the premises where the two men 
had been in contact with the animals. After an 
experienced animal handler fi xated the camel by nose 
pinching, samples were obtained through swabbing with 
fl ocked swabs (FLOQSwabs, Copan Improve Diagnostics, 
Brescia, Italy) that were inserted deep into one of the 
nostrils of the camel. After sampling, swabs were put 
into tubes containing viral transport medium-UTM 
(Copan Diagnostics, Brescia, Italy). In addition, we 
obtained fi ve stool samples from three diff erent cages. 
The sample collection was done jointly by the 
Communicable Disease Control Outbreaks Rapid 
Response Team of the Public Health Department and the 
Animal Health Team, which used full personal-protective 
equipment including N95 masks, goggles, disposable 
gowns, gloves, and head covers during the handling of 
the animals, and during the environmental and human 
sampling. Serum samples were stored at –20°C and all 
other samples were stored at –80°C and were shipped to 
the Netherlands on dry ice. We tested nose swabs with 
two independent RT-PCR targets specifi c for MERS-CoV 
(upE and nucleocapsid [N gene]) in one laboratory 
(Department of Viroscience, Erasmus Medical Center, 
Rotterdam, Netherlands), and did RT-PCR testing with a 
third target (ORF1a) in another laboratory (National 
Institute of Public Health and the Environment, 
Bilthoven, Netherlands).
Laboratory procedures
We inoculated Vero and Huh-7 cells for 1 h with cell-
culture medium containing samples from camel nose or 
MERS-CoV detection MERS-CoV serology
upE ORF1a Nucleocapsid Spike* Virus isolation IFA VNT† Array‡
Camel 1 Negative 37·77 38·16 Negative Negative Positive 640 25 978
Camel 2 38·73 37·01 37·11 Negative Negative Positive 5120 63 645
Camel 3 Negative Negative 36·53 Negative Negative Positive 640 14 684
Camel 4 Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive 2560 53 746
Camel 5 32·52 33·05 30·64 Positive Negative Positive 640 12 007
Camel 6 Negative 37·16 Negative Negative Negative Positive 2560 57 667
Camel 7 33·97 34·43 32·72 Positive 37·71 Positive 640 10 740
Camel 8 Negative Negative 37·38 Negative Negative Positive 5120 63 775
Camel 9 38·04 38·35 36·63 Negative Negative Positive 2560 63 465
Camel 10 Negative Negative 38·22 Negative Negative Positive 160 8002
Camel 11 37·09 34·99 34·90 Positive Negative Positive 2560 37 612
Camel 12 Negative Negative 36·94 Negative Negative Positive 640 12 396
Camel 13 Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive 2560 63 521
Camel 14 Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive 1280 27 527
Presence of MERS-CoV E gene (upE), ORF1a, and nucleocapsid was assessed with a specifi c TaqMan assay. Virus isolation was done in Vero cells; values shown are cycle 
threshold values by upE test on day 4 after inoculation. IFA was done with fi xed MERS-CoV infected Huh-7 cells tested at a 1/200 dilution. MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus. IFA=immunofl uorescence assay. VNT=virus neutralisation titre. *PCR by MERS-CoV spike specifi c primers and subsequent sequence confi rmation. 
†Lower detection limit of 20. ‡Relative fl uorescence units are shown of 1/2560 dilution of sera when tested in a microarray format.
Table: Detection of genomes and antibodies specifi c for MERS-CoV in 14 dromedary camels
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rectal swabs, or with MERS-CoV (EMC isolate) as a 
positive control. After washing, the cells were incubated 
with medium containing 1% fetal bovine serum at 37°C. 
We stained formaldehyde-fi xed Huh-7 cells infected with 
MERS-CoV by use of heat-inactivated (at 56°C for 30 min) 
camel sera or a MERS-CoV patient’s serum according to 
standard protocols with fl uorescein isothiocyanate-
conjugated antibodies as a second step.
We isolated RNA from 140 μL of swab medium or culture 
supernatant with the QIAamp viral RNA minikit (Qiagen, 
Hilden, Germany) and eluted it in 50 μL. Camel MERS-CoV 
RNA was quantifi ed on the ABI prism 7700 with the 
TaqMan Fast Virus 1-Step Master Mix (Applied Biosystems, 
Bleiswijk, Netherlands), with 10 μL isolated RNA, one 
TaqMan mix, 0·5 U of uracil-N-glycosylase, primer, and 
probes targeting the N gene, upE, or ORF1a as described 
elsewhere.17,18 We used RNA dilutions isolated from a 
MERS-CoV isolate EMC stock as a standard control.
10 μL of RNA was reverse transcribed with the 
Superscript III fi rst strand synthesis system (Invitrogen, 
Bleiswijk, Netherlands) with random hexamers. cDNA 
was used to amplify six diff erent camel MERS-CoV 
fragments, including a partial spike gene by use of pfu 
Ultra II fusion HS DNA polymerase (Agilent 
technologies, Santa Clara, CA, USA). We did the PCR as 
follows: one initial denaturation step of 95°C for 5 min, 
followed by 39 cycles of 95°C for 20 s, 50°C for 20 s, 72°C 
for 2 min, and a fi nal extension of 72°C for 5 min. The 
amplifi ed camel MERS-CoV fragments were sequenced 
directly on both strands with the BigDye Terminator 
version 3.1 cycle sequencing kit on an ABI PRISM 
3100 genetic analyser (Applied Biosystems). We 
generated PhyML phylogenetic trees with Seaview 4 
software with the approximate likelihood-ratio test based 
on a Shimodaira-Hasegawa-like procedure, which used a 
general time reversible as substitution model. We used 
nearest neighbour interchange and subtree pruning and 
regrafting-based tree search algorithms to estimate the 
tree topologies.19
RNA from human samples (sputum for Qatar 3 case 
and throat swab for Qatar 4 case) was extracted with the 
NucliSENS easyMag system (bioMérieux, Basingstoke, 
UK). Viral sequences from the two human cases were 
isolated (with the same techniques as for camel cases) in 
the Reference Department, Public Health England, 
London, UK. We used primers designed against 
sequences of MERS-CoV JX869059_EMC/2012 and bat 
coronaviruses HKU4 and HKU5 to amplify the entire 
genomes from human cases for sequencing on an 
Illumina MiSeq sequencer, subsequently indicated as 
Qatar_3_2013 (case 1) and Qatar_4_2013 (case 2).
The sequences obtained in this study were 
deposited in GenBank under the following accession 
numbers: Camel_MERS-CoV/Qatar_1_2013_ORF1a_1_
partial, KF933380; Camel_MERS-CoV/Qatar_1_2013_
ORF1a_3_partial, KF933381; Camel_MERS-CoV/
Qatar_1_2013_ORF1b_partial, KF933382; Camel_
MERS-CoV/Qatar_1_2013_Spike_partial, KF933383; 
Camel_MERS-CoV/Qatar_1_2013_ORF4b_ful l , 
KF933384; Camel_MERS-CoV/Qatar_1_2013_ORF1a_2_
partial, KF933385; Qatar_3_2013, KF961221; and 
Qatar_4_2013, KF961222.
We tested all sera for the presence of IgG antibodies 
reactive with MERS-CoV (residues 1–747),  severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV; residues 
1–676), and human coronavirus OC43 (residues 1–760) 
S1 antigens as described previously.13,20 We report results 
as the relative mean fl uorescent intensity (RFU) for 
each set of quadruplicate spots per antigen. We did IgG 
antibody testing only because anti-camel IgM conjugates 
were not available.
For virus neutralisation, serum samples were heat-
inactivated by incubation for 30 min at 56°C. We 
prepared twofold serial dilutions with 96 well plates, 
starting dilution at 1/10. MERS-CoV was diluted in 
B
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Figure 1: Characterisation of dromedary camel Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) 
genome sequences
(A) Nucleotide sequence fragments obtained from the nose swab of camel 5 that cover diff erent parts of the 
MERS-CoV genome; purple boxes (1–6) show diff erent fragments obtained with primers specifi c to MERS-CoV; red 
triangles show the position of the real-time TaqMan probes targeting diff erent regions of the MERS-CoV genome. 
(B) Nucleotide sequences of representative MERS-CoVs’ concatenated 4·2 kb sequences were analysed and a 
phylogenetic tree was constructed by the PhyML method; values at the branches show the result of the 
approximate likelihood-ratio, with values less than 0·70 not depicted.
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Iscove’s modifi ed Dulbecco’s medium (IMDM) 
supplemented with penicillin, streptomycin, and 1% 
fetal bovine serum, to a dilution of 2000 TCID50 per mL. 
We then added 50 μL of virus suspension to the plates 
and the plates were incubated at 37°C for 1 h. Next, we 
incubated virus-serum mixtures on 96 well plates 
containing Vero cells for 1 h, and then washed them with 
phosphate buff er saline and incubated them with IMDM 
and 1% fetal bovine serum for 5 days.
Role of the funding source
The sponsors of the study had no role in study design, 
data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or 
writing of the report. The corresponding authors had full 
access to all the data in the study and had fi nal 
responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Results
Samples from 14 camels were obtained on Oct 17, 2013 
(table, fi gure 1). Nose swab specimens from fi ve camels 
were positive for all three assays (upE, N gene, and 
ORF1a), one sample reacted in two assays, and fi ve camels 
tested positive in only one RT-PCR assay. Subsequently, 
all samples were subjected to a PCR assay targeting the 
spike gene of MERS-CoV (nucleotides 22449–22806) to 
obtain a fragment for sequencing as defi nitive 
confi rmation. Such sequencing confi rmed the presence 
of sequences specifi c to MERS-CoV in three camels.
Alignment of these partial spike gene sequences with 
known human MERS-CoV sequences, including those 
determined from the two related human cases and some 
other human MERS-CoV isolates such as Hafr-Al-
Batin_1_2013 (KF600628) and Riyadh_3_2013 (KF600613), 
showed 100% identity, but the sequences diff ered from 
EMC MERS-CoV, which is used routinely in the Erasmus 
MC laboratory, by one nucleotide. The three camel 
MERS-CoV sequences obtained by this approach were 
identical. Virus culture attempts were not successful, 
although one sample tested for camel 7 yielded a positive 
RT-PCR of the supernatant (table) and staining of the 
fi xed virus-infected cells (data not shown). Further passage 
of the virus on Vero cells, however, was not successful. In 
addition, serum from camel 9 showed low levels of 
MERS-CoV as determined by RT-PCR, and all other camel 
sera tested negative (data not shown). Rectal swabs and 
faecal materials were negative for MERS-CoV when tested 
for reactivity in the upE and N gene RT-PCRs.
Further sequencing of the virus from camel 5 with 
primers specifi c to MERS-CoV rendered six diff erent 
fragments covering 4·2 kb across the MERS-CoV genome 
(fi gure 1). Fragments 1 (nucleotides 6708–7459), 
2 (8095–9034), and 3 (10073–10658) were located in ORF1a, 
fragment 4 (18792–19584) in ORF1b, fragment 5 
(22449–22806) in the spike gene, and fragment 6 
(26074–26846) in ORF4b. The sequences obtained from 
the human cases from the same farm diff ered by one 
nucleotide diff erence in ORF1a and one in ORF4b. The 
MERS-CoV EMC isolate diff ers by eight nucleotides from 
the camel MERS-CoV in ORF1a. Alignment of the 
divergent 940 nucleotide ORF1a fragment (data not shown) 
and a 4·2 kb concatenated sequence fragment was used 
for PhyML phylogenetic analysis. The camel MERS-CoV 
clustered with viral sequences obtained from the two 
human cases related to the farm and with a sequence from 
Hafr-Al-Batin as the next closest relative (fi gure 1). Less 
stringent methods of analysis do show limited bootstrap 
support (data not shown), in line with relatively limited 
sequence variation within this fragment.
All camel sera were positive in the immunofl uorescence 
assay when tested in a 1/200 dilution (fi gure 2). When 
serum samples from camels were tested at diff erent 
dilutions on the microarray, we noted reactivity with 
MERS-CoV antigen, but not the SARS-CoV antigen. 
Reactivity to human coronavirus OC43 antigen, as a 
Figure 2: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) serological response in camels from 
Qatar
Immunofl uorescence staining (green) of MERS-CoV infected and formalin fi xed Huh7 cells (nuclei shown in blue) 
with serum samples from camel 5 (A), camel 7 (B), and camel 11 (C),  negative camel control serum sample (D), a 
serum sample from a human case of MERS-CoV (E), and a serum sample from a healthy person (F). Fluorescent 
intensities (G) in relative fl uorescence units (RFU) for MERS-CoV S1 antigen are shown for the 14 dromedary 
camels when tested at serum dilution 1/2560 versus virus neutralisation titres.
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proxy to betacoronavirus, varied between negative (less 
than the cutoff  value of 4000) and saturating signals (data 
not shown). Consistent with the array data, all serum 
samples had MERS-CoV neutralising capacity, with titres 
varying between 160 and 5120  (fi gure 2). We also noted a 
strong correlation between microarray titres and virus 
neutralising antibody titres (fi gure 2). The two camels 
with the highest MERS-CoV load in the swabs as shown 
by TaqMan assay (camels 5 and 7) had a relatively low 
serum neutralisation titre of 640.
Discussion
We present, to our knowledge, the fi rst virological 
confi rmation of MERS-CoV in dromedary camels (panel). 
We and others previously reported MERS-CoV neutralising 
antibodies in dromedary camels from the Canary Islands, 
Oman, and Egypt, suggesting circulation of MERS-CoV or 
a MERS-CoV-like virus in camels.13,14 High prevalences and 
antibody titres were reported in the camels from Oman 
and Egypt suggesting widespread circulation. However, 
virological testing was unable to detect MERS-CoV viral 
sequences in camels, probably because only faecal and 
serum samples were analysed. In addition, shedding 
kinetics of MERS-CoV in camels (and human beings) are 
unknown, and therefore, inter pretation of negative RT-
PCR results from screening is diffi  cult because positive 
and negative predictive values remain to be determined.22
In the outbreak reported, we showed evidence for 
presence of the virus in six camels according to inter-
nationally recommended criteria of two independent 
RT-PCR targets. Furthermore, we used sequence confi rm-
ation as an additional test to increase the level of 
certainty—during an emerging disease outbreak such as 
this, options for validation of assays for clinical testing are 
limited.22 Discrepancies between assays can be explained 
by diff erences in detection limits, or by diff erences in 
specifi city of the primer sets. In our study, N gene RT-PCR 
yielded four additional weak positive results that could not 
be confi rmed by any other method, and an individual 
ORF1a RT-PCR identifi cation was made for only one 
animal. These cases could have resulted from mispriming, 
or represent presence of levels of virus around the 
detection limit, as can be expected at the end of the 
infection cycle. Nevertheless, our results suggest a 
widespread and recent outbreak in this herd, coinciding 
with infection in two people.
Our data should not be taken as evidence for infection 
of people from the camels. Comparison of sequence data 
from the ORF1a gene and a concatenated 4·2 kb 
sequence from the human and camel viruses showed 
that these viruses are very similar, but distinct. Notably, 
samples from camels and people were analysed in 
diff erent laboratories in the Netherlands and the UK. 
The data provided show proof that camels can be infected 
with MERS-CoV. The sequence diff erence between 
human and animal viruses from the farm, based on the 
available overlapping sequence, is so small that we 
cannot conclude whether the people on the farm were 
infected by the camels or vice versa. Another possibility 
is that people and camels were infected from a third as 
yet unknown source. Although additional sequencing 
might provide improved resolution, it probably will not 
provide conclusive evidence. The most important 
unknown is the exact timing of infections, both in the 
infected people and camels. If the virus entered the farm 
through either the people or the camels, the infections 
observed would probably have resulted from a chain of 
transmissions that introduced mutations. 
Because we did not identify any seronegative animals 
that were PCR positive, and because all animals had 
MERS-CoV neutralising antibodies, our sampling 
probably took place relatively late in the outbreak on this 
farm. A more detailed analysis of the outbreak, including 
testing of additional animals and environmental samples 
is ongoing, as are attempts to obtain full MERS-CoV 
genomes of the human and animal specimens. We 
cannot exclude the possibility that other common 
livestock species including cattle, sheep, and goats, or 
other animals including wild species were involved in the 
spread of MERS-CoV. While confi rmation of the source is 
awaited, we recommend that a detailed case history is 
taken of any cases of MERS-CoV, including review of any 
animal exposures (including animal products), and 
targeted (prospective) serosurveys to determine what risk 
factors are associated with human infection.
Panel: Research in context
Systematic review
We searched PubMed for articles published in English up to 
Dec 1, 2013, with the search terms “novel coronavirus EMC” 
or “MERS-CoV”. We identifi ed 121 reports linked to the 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). 
One report21 described the detection in one bat specimen of 
a single 181 bp fragment in a highly conserved area of the 
coronavirus genome, identical to the human MERS-CoV 
laboratory isolate EMC.
Interpretation
Our report describes the fi rst detection of MERS-CoV in 
dromedary camels on a farm in Qatar that had been linked 
to human cases of the disease. Our study provides proof that 
MERS-CoV has infected dromedary camels in Qatar. Our 
results suggest the simultaneous occurrence of a MERS-CoV 
outbreak in people and camels. On the basis of the present 
data, we cannot conclude whether the people on the farm 
were infected by the camels or vice versa. Another 
possibility is that people and camels could have been 
infected from a third as yet unknown source. We 
recommend that detailed case histories be taken, including 
review of any animal exposures including animal products, 
and targeted (prospective) serosurveys to determine what 
risk factors—other than contact with an individual with the 
infection—are associated with human infection.
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